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DNA is an identifi er. We are not defi ned by our genome, 
but our DNA is ours and we can be identifi ed through it. 
Despite the comments made at the time, it was neither 
wicked nor tacky when Craig Venter, shortly after the 
fi rst human genome sequence was published in 2001, 
publicly revealed that he was one donor of the samples 
used in Celera’s genome sequencing project [1]. Venter 
later explained that by identifying himself as a donor he 
had intended to demystify the human genome and to 
reduce public fears about the potential misuse of genetic 
information [2].
The old days
Regarding the past puts the issues of identifi ability and 
disclosure of personal and public genomes into pers-
pective. Th e protection of individuals against the possible 
negative consequences of disclosure of their genetic 
information has been a major concern throughout the 
history of human sequencing. Th e Human Genome 
Project (HGP) has placed the protection of individuals at 
the core of its Ethical, Legal and Social Implications 
program since its inception as part of the HGP in 1989. 
In 1983, the US President’s Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, as the designated advisory body to 
the Congress on these matters, reported on ‘Screening 
and Counseling for Genetic Conditions’. Th e requirement 
of confi dentiality already ranked fi rst - before ‘autonomy’ - 
among the Commission’s fi ve recommendations. Th e 
Commission recommended that genetics-related infor-
mation be kept confi dential and coded, although, notably, 
even these nascent recommendations made this condi-
tional: ‘whenever that is compatible with the purpose of 
the data bank’ [3].
At the time there existed no doubt that, with the 
appropriate measures (in particular through coding tech-
niques), anonymity could be preserved. Yet evidence 
contradicting this viewpoint - in the form of forensic 
identifi cation of individuals using DNA - already existed 
in the 1980s. As genome sequencing becomes increas-
ingly widespread and large amounts of data and bio-
specimens accumulate in many diff erent types of bio-
banks, addressing the identifi ability of individuals is an 
increasingly pressing issue.
Sharing data, protecting privacy
Biobanks and repositories were established to facilitate 
the storage and redistribution of samples and data. Th ese 
eff orts seek to meet core scientifi c requirements of 
sample and data sharing for the purposes of comparison, 
re-analysis and avoidance of redundancies in research 
eff orts. Fulfi lling the ethical and legal requirement of 
protecting study participants and, in particular, shielding 
their identity leads to a fundamental tension between 
data sharing and privacy.
Researchers, database managers and biobank directors 
have tried their best to meet both goals by using methods 
to obfuscate and de-identify biological material and data. 
Th ese measures are not always successful. In 2007 the 
National Institutes of Health mandated that genome-
wide association studies deposit data in a central data-
base. Aggregate data were thought to be ‘safe’ and were 
thus publicly shared by the database of Genotypes and 
Phenotypes (dbGaP). Th at policy was immediately modi-
fi ed by dbGaP once it was demonstrated that individual 
genotypes were identifi able in pooled data [4].
Th is revision may have been exceptional: regulators are 
understandably reluctant to admit to incorrect assump-
tions about data safety. Th e introduction of restrictions 
on access to materials that have already been dissemi-
nated and have found widespread use does not add to the 
credibility of regulatory bodies. Th e recent re-identifi  ca-
tion of widely disseminated ‘de-identifi ed’ samples by 
surname inference led to the removal of some publicly 
shared information, but not to the removal of associated 
data and samples from repositories [5]. Notably, the 
removed data were considered to be compliant with 
anonymization requirements mandated by the US Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and re-
identifi cation occurred despite this. Today it is clear that 
individuals are identifi able through their unique bio-
logical profi les, and evidence of this - for example, from 
gene expression or microbiome datasets  - continues to © 2010 BioMed Central Ltd
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accumulate. Rapid advancements in the genomic sciences 
have tremendously increased our understanding of 
human biology. Global collaboration among researchers 
and sharing of human specimens and data to corroborate 
findings are key conditions of good scientific practice. 
Traditional research ethics regarding human subjects is 
based on different assumptions about scientific practice, 
assumptions of ‘anonymity’ being just one example, 
thereby posing increasing dilemmas to the scientific 
community.
Personal disclosure
At the other end of the privacy spectrum, opposite to 
presumed anonymity, is personal disclosure. At the time, 
many questioned the wisdom of Craig Venter’s decision 
to reveal his inclusion in the compound human genome 
sequence published by his group [1]. Such a disclosure 
may have been in conflict with the study protocol, and 
Venter’s action may have warranted more transparency 
with his colleagues. In addition, with some effort one 
could eventually extract trait and disease predictions 
about him and the other DNA donors  - some of which 
could be considered stigmatizing.
However, personal disclosure can have great value. 
Disclosure has been at the foundation of most patient 
organizations and research-focused disease interest 
groups: giving up anonymity and sharing experiences has 
been for many patients and their relatives the only route 
to improved diagnostics, treatment and care. The non-
profit advocacy organization Genetic Alliance (and its 
many member organizations) is one excellent example. A 
case involving mental health information, which is 
currently considered to be potentially highly stigmatizing, 
illustrates the great value in disclosure. In 1908, mental 
health care in the United States was changed forever 
when Clifford Beers disclosed his personal history of 
mental illness and the miserable state of care in his auto-
biography [6], sparking a movement leading to compre-
hensive mental health reform.
Identifiability today
The prevention of the identification of individuals 
through meticulous and costly de-identification proce-
dures has kept investigators, statisticians, data managers, 
ethics committees and oversight bodies busy, as data and 
sample collections have grown to form large databases 
and biorepositories.
Yet DNA is an identifier and, as such, all biological 
material and sequence data can ultimately reveal the 
identity of their source. While anonymity and confi-
dentiality are promised to study participants, researchers 
are sharing data by default, as a necessary condition of 
good scientific practice and as required by funding 
agencies.
The Personal Genome Project (PGP) has been the first 
research project to make public sharing of data a reality 
while avoiding unsustainable promises of anonymity to 
participants, while their comprehensive genotype and 
phenotype data are made accessible in the public domain 
[7-9]. Moreover, the value of the availability of robustly 
annotated variant sets is increasingly being recognized 
[10]. Going forward, researchers and participants should 
consider similar models to the PGP that allow them to 
build open-access resources; the outcomes and benefits 
of such clear and open collaborations may well exceed 
current expectations.
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